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EXTERNAL DISCUSSION FORUM (EDF)

**"NATO in Conflict Management:
The Case of the Caucasus."**

Chairperson: Stephan M. KOPPÁNYI

My name is Stephan KOPPÁNYI and I am 24 years old. I was born in Vienna where I grew up, went to school and finally made my "Matura" (A-Levels) in June 1998. In October 1998 I started my studies at the University of Vienna. I am doing two subjects at the same time: law on the one hand and history in combination with French and art's history on the other hand. Between October 2002 and July 2003 I was studying at the "Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris" in France. In summer 2002 I was working as a volunteer at the Austrian Trade Commission in New Delhi, India.

I am speaking German (mother tongue), English, French and a bit of Spanish. Journeys brought me to many countries in middle and western Europe, to Greece, Turkey, Jordan, India, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru. My hobbies are travelling, skiing, hiking, dancing, listening to music,... to mention only some of them.

I hope you got a little impression of my personality and I am looking forward to seeing you in the External Discussion Forum.

Chairperson 2: Haik KARAPETIAN

My Name is Haik KARAPETIAN. I was born in Armenia and since 1992 I live in Vienna. I went to secondary school in Yerevan 1985 to 1992. Afterwards I moved to Vienna where I attended to Secondary Grammar School and finished it in 1999. From November 1999 to June 2000 I served in the Austrian Federal Army. In order to improve my knowledge of English, I worked for Austrian Airlines from October 2000 to September 2001. I speak Armenian Russian German and English fluently.

Since October 2001 I have been studying Political Science and Psychology at the University of Vienna. I am interested in Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy and in future I would to work in that field.

During my study I have already done two internship programs in the Ministry of Foreign Affair and in the Ministry of Defence.

Usher: Nicole BRANDL

Hi everybody, my name is Nicole Brandl (born on 18 April 1981) and I grew up in the famous, picturesque town of Salzburg. I am a student of Commerce and Business & Law at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, where I specialised in International Management as well as European Law. This reflects my profound interest in cross-boarder exchanges and transnational networks. In the framework of a master program (CEMS – Community of European Management Schools), I spent one term at HEC in Paris. This international track record is enriched with internships in Paris, London, Brussels and, currently, Montreal.

As I would like to deepen my experience in the field of International Politics, I regularly participate in excursions and discussions of AFA and I am glad to support the VIMUN team 2004.

During my spare time, I love traveling all over the world, doing sports and meeting friends. From times to times, I really enjoy coming back home and spending some relaxing days in Salzburg and the Salzkammergut!

Seize the day – I am looking forward to getting you to know!

Introduction to the Issue:

Civil Wars in Caucasus

After the break-up of the Soviet Union lots of civil wars in Central Asia, in Moldavia and the Caucasus Region started.

In Caucasus three major violent Conflicts have happened. The first Conflict starts in 1998, the quarrel between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabagh. Nagorno-Karabagh was an autonomous region in Azerbaijan, but mainly populated by Armenians. This quest of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to join Armenia lead to a large-scale conflict and massive ethnic cleansing on the territories of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Secondly, there has been a series of internal wars in Georgia (1989 – 1993), that involve the struggle for power on the state level, and clashes over Georgia's two breakaway regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We treat these three conflicts as three distinct episodes of one conflict.

The third major Caucasian conflict is the Chechen war. In 1991, Chechnya declared its independence, thus unilaterally seceding from the Russian Federation. This move eventually triggered the first Chechen war (1994 – 1996), which Russia lost on the battlefield. Since October 1999, Russia has again engaged the Chechen rebels, trying to re-establish its state authority. Until today, there is a low-intensity war going in Chechnya.

It is noteworthy that Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were all unable to win the wars against their secessionist regions. Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are *de facto* independent 'statelets', and so was Chechnya until the second Russian military intervention in 1999. On the other hand, none of the secessionist regions have been able to gain internationally recognized independence, and none of the conflict has formally ended with a peace treaty.

The military victory of rebels is statistically rather a rare occurrence, since the central state usually commands more resources than the challenger. In the Caucasus, the success of the breakaway territories may be explained by the weakness of the newly independent states. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan had to organise their state capacities from scratch. They were economically and politically weak states that lacked the resources for intensive warfare, their soldiers were badly trained and hardly motivated to fight a dangerous war in order to keep peripheral regions within the central state. In addition, both Georgia and Azerbaijan were plagued by internal power struggles. Thus, the violent contest between 'secessionist rebels' and 'states' in the Caucasus resembled the competition between two up-starts. The wars of Azerbaijan against the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia against the breakaway Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, the 'rebel' up-starts proved to be much more efficient in organizing violence (including resources from outside) than the 'up-start states' they challenged. Consequently, the 'rebels' won on the battlefield.

Ethnic Federalism

It is a peculiarity of the Soviet legacy that the fault line of all hot conflicts in the regions can be traced back to the system of ethno-federalism of the USSR. The Soviet Union was an asymmetric federation that consisted of territorial units with different status. On the first level, there were the fifteen Union republics. (SSR, *Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*, *Soviet Socialist Republic*). First order units were, according to the Soviet constitution, sovereign states and possessed all institutional prerequisites for statehood. They had political institutions, political symbols, a constitution, borders, education and mass media in the titular nations language, citizenship and a titular nation. *De iure* they had the right to have their own armed forces, and to secede from the Union.

Within first order units (the Union Republics) and subordinated to these, there were units of the second order, the ASSR (*Avtonomnaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika*, *Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic*). ASSR were defined as autonomous territories of a national minority within a Union Republic. Like these, the ASSR also possessed political institutions, borders, a constitution and a titular nation. They were entitled to have a university and publishing houses. An ASSR did not have the right to

secede from the Union. They could be transferred to another SSR, provided that the centre and both involved SSR agreed.

Next to the ASSR came the Autonomous regions (AO, *Avtonomnaya oblast'*, autonomous region). These were also territories of a national minority within a Union Republic. The language of the titular nation of an AO was considered to be an official language. AO had a high degree of control over local affairs but had less privileges than the ASSR. An AO was not entitled to its own national university nor to its own media outlets in the local language. AO had also no bureaucracies of their own and had to share cadres with the Union Republican administration. Thus, administrative key posts were distributed at the republican level.

In Soviet practice, the sovereignty of the federal units was subordinated to the communist party. However, the Soviet system of ethno-federalism granted the members of the titular nation a high degree of control over local affairs and privileged access to scarce resources, such as education, employment and positions in the administration.

The most important aspect of this system of ethno-federalism was that these federal units had their titular nation; ethnicity thus became 'territorialized'. Once the central control weakened, this linkage of a territory to an ethnic group provided an excellent breeding ground for a wave of secessionism: The socialist ethno-federalism had provided the titular nations with a clear cut territory, a state bureaucracy, mass media, an education system and national symbols. These were assets that considerably reduced the cost of secessionism.

It is thus no coincidence that all cases of hot conflict in the Caucasus emerged in ethno-territorial units subordinated to Union republics. Chechnya was an ASSR within the Russian Federation; Abkhazia was an ASSR and South-Ossetia an AO within the SSR of Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh an AO within the SSR of Azerbaijan.

The Economic Fundamentals

An attempt to apply methods of politico-economic analysis the Caucasian conflicts appears promising, particularly due to the limited explanatory power of the prevalent ethno-political analysis. However, an immediately obvious problem for such an attempt is the absence of reliable economic data, which makes a significant difference with the relatively solid data on ethnic composition provided by the population census of 1989. The question of accurate measurement of the GDP of the USSR has not been resolved even retrospectively, while the data on the constituent Soviet republics is even less meaningful, and the sketchy information on lower level units (ASSR and AO) makes practically no sense at all. All conflicts in the Caucasus (with the possible exception of the war in Abkhazia, which in fact also saw its first clashes back in 1989) started in the last two years of the USSR. The crucial pre-conflict phase was thus exactly the period of 1985-1988, when inconsistent reform attempts were weakening systemic economic links, and the official statistics had fewer and fewer connections with the reality. As a general point of reference, it could be noted that the level of militarization of the economy in the three Caucasian republics as well as in the North Caucasus was significantly lower than the average for the USSR.

Another related problem involves the growth of the 'shadow economy' in the 1980s, for which there is absolutely no reliable estimates. Most of the economic activities that remained unregistered by Soviet official statistics had nothing to do with crime and in fact the authorities in Moscow attempted to legalize large parts of it by approving new legislation on co-operatives and enterprises in 1986-1987. The net result, however, was further increase of semi-legal businesses, which skilfully doctored reports on their operations and profits in order to avoid taxation. For the purposes of this study, we can define 'shadow economy' as a sum of economic activities related to production (small-scale manufacturing and agriculture beyond the subsistence level), trade and services that are unregistered by official statistics but do not violate the key norms of criminal law (like, for instance, narco-trafficking or extortion).

In the Caucasus, 'shadow economy' had evolved by the late 1980s into a particularly complex social phenomenon, which successfully integrated official structures and established its own norms and rules as the basis for organization of societies. Two economic sectors that were particularly involved in 'shadow' activities were agriculture and tourism. The former stimulated growth of networks that connected the producers of high-value products (primarily fruits and flowers) with the 'kolkhoz markets' across the USSR. The latter brought the growth of local networks aimed at servicing millions of unregistered tourists. One particular sector of the 'shadow economy' that showed sharp growth after the introduction of the 'anti-alcohol policy' in 1986 was illegal production of wines and spirits. The system of 'shadow economy' has successfully

adapted to the post-Soviet situation, so currently in the three South Caucasus states the most conservative estimates give its share as 40-50% of the GDP.

That range of estimates can be safely applied retrospectively to the mid-1980s, with the necessary reservation that at that time the 'shadow economy', while illegal, was significantly less criminalized, since the organised crime was a much less developed phenomenon.

What's testable, what not?

This study aims at testing the key variables determining the outbreak and duration of violent conflicts, as developed in the main theoretical papers of the DECRG project. There are, however, a number of regional peculiarities that make it impossible to examine the whole range of indicators and necessitate the reduction of the focus of this study to a more limited set of parameters. This set, nevertheless, covers the same four groups of variables (economic, demographic, geographic, and historic), where the most serious questions concern the economic indicators, so that in several instances expert assessments could be the only substitute for quantitative data.

The problems start immediately with the estimates of the GDP dynamics. While for the USSR in general the trend was of gradual reduction of growth in the first half of the 1980s and of stagnation in the second half of the decade, leading to the sharp decline in 1990-1992, in the Caucasus the slow growth of early and mid-1980s was possibly compensated by the blossoming of the 'shadow' economy. There were certainly rich and promising opportunities in the semi-legal co-operative markets, but the eruption of several conflicts in 1989 interrupted this development. While it is very difficult to pinpoint the break of the trajectory, it is possible to establish that the conflicts were not linked to the overall economic decline but led to deep and sustained devastation of the most productive and profitable sectors of the economy.

The attempts to measure GDP per capita either in dynamics or in relative terms (comparatively with other parts of the USSR) appear not very promising due to the absence of any data on the 'shadow' economy. The possibility to substitute this indicator with the estimates of the levels of education (male enrolment in secondary schooling) is non-existent: in the USSR, the secondary school education was free and widely available; this system is largely still in place, despite all the devastation and dislocation caused by the wars. It is also not possible to provide any estimates of the differences in income distribution or land distribution (private ownership of land was limited to a few hundred square meters around the house). While there was some hidden unemployment (particularly in such economically backward regions as Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia), in the pre-conflict period the opportunities in the labour market were quite promising, and it was only with the escalation of the conflicts that the unemployment really became a mass phenomenon.

The key indicator of dependence on export of primary commodities is tested albeit with reservations. Of all the Caucasian republics and regions it is only Azerbaijan (and to a much lesser degree Chechnya) that has significant resources of oil and gas with serious export potential. However, in the pre-conflict period of late 1980s, the profits from primary commodities exports were concentrated in Moscow, while the deliveries to other Soviet republics were not generating any real profits. Expectations of future profits might have been a factor in conflict developments in Azerbaijan and Chechnya but it is problematic to measure those. The deliveries of agricultural products to the markets across the USSR were not 'exports' in the pre-conflict period and declined drastically with their escalation.

While geographic and ethno-demographic indicators (including population dispersion) are examined and appear highly relevant, the historic measurements are hard to apply. Strictly speaking, there were no violent conflicts inside the USSR since the Civil War of 1918-1922, so the variable is negative in all cases. On the other hand, historical memories and traumas (for instance, the deportation of Chechens in 1944 and the Armenian genocide of 1920) played a crucially important role for conflict mobilization, so the factor cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. There are certain nuances with measuring the impact of religious tensions as well. While the Soviet society in the 1980s was predominantly non-religious (for that matter, it is impossible to estimate the religious fractionalisation and, accordingly, the social fractionalisation), the escalation of conflicts created some incentives for emphasising religious 'fault lines' and some space for religious extremism (particularly Islamic extremism in Chechnya); the problem, therefore, deserves some attention. Even more attention has to be paid to the impact of such factor as democratisation, which appears highly relevant in the context of the collapse of the USSR.

Overall, despite the inapplicability of several indicators (male secondary schooling, religious and social fractionalisation, income and land inequality), certain reservations regarding other parameters and the

general need to supplement the quantitative data with expert assessments, the case study could yield some important results for testing the basic hypotheses of the project.

Anatomy and Dynamics of Violence

Our sample comprises five cases of internal wars. Following the definition of the State Failure Project, four of them (Chechnya, Abkhazia, Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) qualify as ethnic wars: "Ethnic wars are episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status." The fifth episode, the civil war in Georgia, can be described as a revolutionary war, that is, an "episode of violent conflict between government and politically organised groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government."

In all of these cases, at least one of the warring parties was therefore a state. However, the "state-rebel-dichotomy" in the Caucasus of 1989 – 1993 is a conceptual smoke screen that veils some of the most intrinsic features of the region at the time. Firstly, both the "states" and "the rebels" virtually had to build up their capacities from the scratch. The war between "rebel" Karabakh and "state" Azerbaijan was fought until the end of 1992 on both sides by militias. The army of the Georgian "state", that confronted the Ossetian "rebels", consisted of some police units and a few hundred volunteers. Secondly, all "rebels" claimed to be independent states and were, as much as the state from which they seceded, engaged in state building. Since the "state" was more of a project than a reality, the borders between publicly organised, state sponsored violence and privately organised, entrepreneurial violence were blurred. The only meaningful difference between "rebel" and "states" was that the "states" possessed international legal sovereignty, by virtue of the fact that they had been Union republics within the Soviet Union, while the "rebels", as former second order units (ASSR), were denied this privilege.

Conflict escalation and de-escalation is, rather than a temporal sequence of different phases in time, a dynamic process, during which the rationales of the conflicting parties and the incentive structures that govern their action undergo dramatic changes. The initial rationales of a dispute may thus be very different from those that actually trigger the conflict and from those that eventually lead to either the stabilization of a violent environment or to a departure from violence. Whatever the rationale for escalation may have been, sustained organised violence has a high probability of stabilizing for a certain period as what Georg Elwert calls markets of violence. While the core of the conflict may still be socio-political, the strategic actions of the entrepreneurs of violence are increasingly structured by short-term economic gains. The organization of violence is expensive, and sustained violence needs continuous investment. Therefore, entrepreneurs of violence engage in economic activities, which characteristically combine legal business activities, organised crime and warfare. This economy tends to be integrated in transnational networks of trade and investment.

Entrepreneurs of violence engage in drug or weapons trafficking, in kidnapping, extortion, or in taxing the second economy. Profits are reinvested, or kept in offshore banks. Gradually, short-term economic interests replace long-term political ones, and entrepreneurs of violence become interested in avoiding battles and sustaining profit.

Once a market of violence is established, there is a strong rationale for the warlords to stabilise the *status quo*. If government officials receive a share of the revenues from the market of violence (or are themselves embarking on warlord politics), they might also become interested in prolonging this violence. In such cases sustaining low-level violence becomes a rational objective of both, the 'rebels' and the 'state'. This view contradicts the commonly held view of prolonged conflicts as 'unintended and anarchical outcome', and it also contradicts the official discourse of governments and rebels. Such a situation is characterised by the lack of real battles between soldiers and rebels. Both sides may pretend to fight a war, but neither side is determined to commit substantial resources in order to win and end the war. All violent conflicts in the Caucasus developed for a certain period into markets of violence. In comparison to markets of violence like Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo, this stage was, relatively brief, except for Chechnya, which has been completely torn apart by rival entrepreneurs of violence.

In the cases of internal wars in the Caucasus, at least for a certain time "rebellion" thus can be modelled as 'quasi-criminal' activity, which is profitable during the conflict. Likewise, our cases indicate that the factors that trigger outbreak of violence are different from those that determine duration.

Introduction to the Committee

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 19 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the *North Atlantic Treaty* signed on 4th April 1949. In accordance with the treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. Thus it protects the allies common values of democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This central Alliance objective has taken on renewed significance since the end of the Cold War because, for the first time in the post-war history of Europe, the prospect of its achievement has become a reality.

NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common security interests.

The fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realise their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries.

The North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 - which is the legal and contractual basis for the Alliance - was established within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which reaffirms the inherent right of independent states to individual or collective defence. As the preamble to the Treaty states, the aim of the Allies is to "promote peaceful and friendly relations in the North Atlantic Area." However, at the time of the Treaty's signature, the immediate purpose of NATO was to defend its members against a potential threat resulting from the policies and growing military capacity of the former Soviet Union.

NATO provides the structure which enables the goals of the Alliance to be implemented. It is an inter-governmental organisation in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence. The Organisation provides the forum in which they consult together on any issues they may choose to raise and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security. It provides the structures needed to facilitate consultation and cooperation between them, in political, military and economic as well as scientific and other non-military fields.

The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It creates conditions which favour increased cooperation among Alliance members as well as between members of the Alliance and other countries.

The means by which the Alliance carries out its security policies include the maintenance of a sufficient military capability to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage crises affecting the security of its members; and active promotion of dialogue with other nations and of a cooperative approach to European security, including measures to bring about further progress in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Decision making:

The *North Atlantic Council* (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqués explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of countries which are not members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups have since been created to support

the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters.

The *Defence Planning Committee* (DPC) is normally composed of Permanent Representatives but meets at the level of Defence Ministers at least twice a year, and deals with most defence matters and subjects related to collective defence planning. With the exception of France, all member countries are represented in this forum. The Defence Planning Committee provides guidance to NATO's military authorities and, within the area of its responsibilities, has the same functions and attributes and the same authority as the Council on matters within its competence.

The Defence Ministers of member countries which take part in NATO's DPC meet at regular intervals in the *Nuclear Planning Group* (NPG), where they discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces. These discussions cover a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications and information systems, deployment issues and wider questions of common concern such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation. The Alliance's nuclear policy is kept under review and decisions are taken jointly to modify or adapt it in the light of new developments and to update and adjust planning and consultation procedures.

Crisis management:

Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a major initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The Partnership for Peace Invitation was addressed to all states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now: OSCE) able and willing to contribute to the programme. The invitation has since been accepted by a total of 30 countries. The accession to the Alliance of the three former PfP countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland brings the current number of PfP participants to 27. The activities which each Partner undertakes are based on jointly elaborated Individual Partnership Programmes. The PfP programme focuses on defence-related cooperation but goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between each Partner country and NATO. It has become an important and permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. The programme is helping to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles which underpin the Alliance.

All members of PfP are also members of the *Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (EAPC) which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its Partner countries. EAPC, was set up in 1997 to succeed the NACC. It brings together the 19 Allies and 27 Partners in a forum providing for regular consultation and cooperation. It meets periodically at the level of Ambassadors and Foreign and Defence Ministers. Heads of State and Government of the 46 members can also meet, when appropriate, as they did in Washington in April 1999.

The 1999 Concept confirms that the Alliance's essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means. It affirms the values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and expresses the commitment of the Allies not only to common defence but to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

The decisions taken at Washington thus marked a further stage in the development of the Partnership and EAPC to Euro-Atlantic conflict prevention and crisis management. It has already proved its worth as a forum for political consultations on topics ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo to humanitarian demining and continues to develop. Combined with the improvements in PfP, it is helping to provide NATO and its Partner countries with the tools needed to improve security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole.

Since its introduction, the Partnership has played a valuable role in supporting NATO's overall effort towards conflict prevention and crisis management. Practical PfP cooperation has been instrumental in preparing NATO and Partner forces for joint operations. The interoperability achieved through PfP contributed to the successful integration of Partner forces in IFOR/SFOR and subsequently in KFOR. However, PfP's role is not restricted to its contributions to military operations. Quite apart from its focus on transparency, reform, collaboration and interoperability, the Partnership has made concrete contributions to NATO's conflict prevention and crisis management efforts in general. Well before the air campaign in Kosovo and the subsequent deployment of KFOR, PfP mechanisms were being used in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to signal NATO's commitment to the region and to deal with spill-over

effects of the crisis. PfP mechanisms have also been used in response to the insurgency in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The importance attached by NATO member countries to crisis management issues is well reflected in the above mentioned Strategic Concept published in 1999. It identifies crisis management as one of the Alliance's fundamental security tasks. It states that in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO stands ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations. Maintaining an overall capability to manage crises successfully is an integral part of the Alliance's approach to preserving peace and reinforcing Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

Both the EAPC and PfP will continue to evolve to meet the challenges of the changing security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area. Neither of them has reached its full potential in preventing, managing and defusing crises. Indeed, achieving that potential is one of the Partnership's major future challenges.

Member countries:

Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.

The European Union - EU

Europe has, for centuries, been the scene of frequent and bloody wars. Thus, a number of European leaders came to the conclusion that the only way to secure a lasting peace between European countries was to unite them economically and politically.

So, in 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. As a result, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up, with six members: Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The power to take decisions about the coal and steel industry in these countries was placed in the hands of an independent, supranational body called the "High Authority".

The ECSC was such a success that, within a few years, these same six countries decided to go further and integrate other sectors of their economies. In 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The member states also set about removing trade barriers between them and made plans to form a "common market".

In 1967, the institutions of the three European communities merged. It was from this date onwards that one *Commission*, one *Council of Ministers* and a *European Parliament* came into operation. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced new forms of co-operation between member states' governments - for example, on defence and in the area of "justice and home affairs". By adding this inter-governmental co-operation to the existing "Community" system, the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU).

Economic and political integration between member states of the European Union has meant that these countries have had to make joint decisions on many matters. Accordingly, they have developed common policies in a very wide range of fields - from agriculture to culture, from consumer affairs to competition and from the environment and energy to transport and trade.

As mentioned above, in the early days, the focus was on a common trade policy for coal and steel and a common agricultural policy. Additional policies were added over time as the need arose. So, also the European Union's relations with the rest of the world have gained importance. As well as negotiating major trade and aid agreements with other countries, the EU is also developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Member countries:

Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

The Arab League

The League of Arab States was established on 22nd March, 1945 upon signature of its Pact by seven Arab States. The League is a national and regional organization that seeks to promote closer ties among member-states and coordinate their policies and their economic, cultural and security plans with a view to developing collective cooperation, protecting national security and maintaining the independence and sovereignty of member-states; thereby enhancing the potential for joint Arab action in all fields.

In the political field, the League is entrusted with the tasks of defending the supreme interests and national causes of the Arab world through the implementation of joint action plans at both regional and international levels as well as through the coordination of the relations of member-states with regional and international organizations.

The League is also entrusted with the task of examining whichever disputes that may arise between member-states and to adopt whichever resolutions and measures as may be deemed necessary to settle such disputes by peaceful means.

Economic, social and cultural activities constitute principal and vital elements of joint action in addition to the fact that they provide solid grounds for development, security, liberation and economic integration.

According to the provisions of the Charter, the *Council of the League* is the supreme authority within the League system. The Charter defines the formation, competence, rules of procedure and voting of the Council which may be assisted in its work by some affiliate or standing committee. The Council is formed of representatives of member-states, usually at the level of foreign ministers, their representatives or permanent delegates. The Council is mainly concerned, inter alia, with pursuing the realization of the objectives of the League and following up the implementation of plans and programs that the member-states draw up with respect to Joint Arab action. In addition, the Council has the powers to decide on application for membership and accepting withdrawals from the League, as well as on the introduction of amendments to the Charter. The Council is also entrusted with the task of mediating for the settlement of disputes which threaten or lead to the eruption of hostilities between two of the member-states or between a member-state and a third party. The Council meets twice a year, in March and September, in regular sessions and may convene in extraordinary sessions if need be and should it so be requested by two or more of the member-states.

Member countries:

Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Republic of Yemen.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - OSCE

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

The OSCE approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative: comprehensive in dealing with a wide range of security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratization, election monitoring and economic and environmental security; co-operative in the sense that all OSCE participating States have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus.

The OSCE headquarters are located in Vienna, Austria. The Organization also has offices and institutions located in Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw.

The Organization employs about 3,000 staff in 18 missions and field activities located in South-eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They work 'on the ground' to facilitate political processes, prevent or settle conflicts, and promote civil society and the rule of law.

The OSCE provides a forum for consultation and negotiation among the participating States. The main regular and most important decision-making body is the *Permanent Council* which convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions.

Member countries:

Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan.

The United Nations Organization – UNO

The United Nations Organization is the largest and most important International Organization in the world. The forerunner of the United Nations was the League of Nations, an organization, established in 1919 under the Treaty of Versailles "to promote international cooperation and to achieve peace and security." The International Labour Organization was also created under the Treaty of Versailles as an affiliated agency of the League. The League of Nations ceased its activities after failing to prevent the Second World War.

In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States.

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories.

Amid the threat of nuclear war and seemingly endless regional conflicts, peace-keeping has become an overriding concern of the United Nations. In the process, the activities of blue-helmeted peace-keepers have emerged as the most visible role associated with the world organization.

The United Nations, however, is much more than a peace-keeper and forum for conflict resolution. Often without attracting attention, the United Nations and its family of agencies are engaged in a vast array of work that touches every aspect of people's lives around the world, like Child survival and development, Environmental protection, Human rights, Health and medical research, Alleviation of poverty and economic development, Agricultural development and fisheries, Education, Family planning, Emergency and disaster relief, Air and sea travel, Peaceful uses of atomic energy, Labour and workers' rights and so on.

Member countries:

Almost all countries of the world

Problems:

The problems in the case of Caucasus Nations are that they are not acting as a Union. Until now, 13 years of collapse of the Soviet Union this countries don't they own policy and they don't try to work together, to accept each other.

These three countries, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are members of the Council of Europe. Azerbaijan has a military co-operation with Turkey and Armenia with Russia, Georgia try to accede to NATO. Armenia co-operate also with Arab League and Azerbaijan is working with Israel. In this few examples we can see, that until now there are a lot of problems in this small but important region. Until they don't act as a Union with the same policy with the same defence policy this region will not have the importance as a connector between Europe and Asia.

Therefore, three suggestions are worthwhile looking into:

(1) The importance of the shadow economy and corruption for the original accumulation of war stocks and, to a lesser, degree, for the financing during the war. Official economic indicators seem often of inferior

significance than the shadow economy for the reality on the ground and the incentives of actors. Revenues from the shadow-economy were important assets for the organisation of violence and since competition in the shadow economy became increasingly conflict-prone this economic sector had also a direct influence on the escalation of conflict. While the estimates of the value of every 'shadow economy' are by definition imprecise, some expert assessments of its character and internal/external orientation may show significant correlations with the incidents of war.

(2) At least in the case of the (post-)Soviet Caucasus measuring the openness of state institutions seems less fruitful than measuring the extent of state failure / state capacities.

(3) a distinction between two different types of civil wars may be fruitful: internal struggle for power, and secession. While in some instances these two types might occur simultaneously, or trigger one another, they necessarily have different combination of actors with different 'greed-grievance' motivations. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break-up of Yugoslavia, there were only a few examples of successful secessions; the number of civil wars of this type, however, is sufficiently high to have statistically significant combinations of variables.

(4) Internal fragmentation of the rebels, paradoxically, seems to be factor, which actually can prolong conflict. We see three reasons: (a) Internal fragmentation reduces rebel capacities at state building. This boosts crime, export of crime and raids of maverick warlords. (b) Internal power struggle leads to radicalisation, since warlords try to outflank rivals. (c) Internal fragmentation forces competing warlords to open up new sources of income by expanding their activities.

(5) Protracted conflict changes its own logic: While the core of a protracted conflict may be political, the strategic actions of the entrepreneurs of violence are likely to become more and more structured by short-term economic gains. There are no "political" solutions for violence that's is mainly motivated by private economic profits. One of the crucial tasks for policy makers is therefore to prevent that political conflicts change their structure and turn into markets of violence. Social Science could help by marking turning points.

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